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PROPERTY RIGHTS IN JOHN MARSHALL'S
VIRGINIA: THE CASE OF CRENSHAW AND
CRENSHAW V. SLATE RIVER COMPANY
J. GORDON HYLTON*
As Jim Ely has reminded us, historians have long associated
John Marshall with the twin causes of constitutional nationalism
and the protection of property rights.! However, it would be a
mistake to assume that these two concepts were inseparable or that
it was Marshall's embrace of both that set him apart from his
opponents. Nowhere is the severability of the two propositions more
apparent than with Marshall's critics in his home state of Virginia.
It is well known that opposition to Marshall's view of the United
States Constitution was intense in Virginia where advocates of state
sovereignty such as Spencer Roane, John Taylor of Caroline, John
Randolph of Roanoke, William Branch Giles, Beverley Tucker, and
Able Upshur aggressively criticized what they viewed as Marshall's
unwarranted efforts to expand the authority of the central
government. However, their opposition did not automatically extend
to Marshall's efforts to protect the rights of property owners. While
the Marshall Court opinions in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,'
McCulloch v. Maryland,' and Cohens v. Virginia,4 produced a
firestorm of criticism in the Old Dominion, the more or less
contemporary "property" decisions of Fletcher v. Peck,' Terrett v.
Taylor,' Dartmouth College v. Woodward,' Sturges v. Crowninshield,'
and Green v. Biddle' did not, even though the latter cases limited the
sovereign authority of states to regulate their own economic affairs.
While the second set of cases may have seemed less directly
* Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University.
1. James W. Ely Jr., The Marshall Court and Property Rights: A Reappraisal,

33 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 1023 (2000).
2. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
3. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
4. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).

5. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810).
6.
7.
8.
9.

13 U.S. (9 Cranch.) 43 (1815).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823).
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threatening to state sovereignty than the former, many of Marshall's
Virginia critics were also sympathetic to the results achieved in the
"property rights" cases.1 0
In fact, while Marshall's Virginia critics may have questioned
the legitimacy of his views on the reviewability of the final decisions
of state supreme courts by the federal judiciary, they, by and large,
shared his belief that the protection of property rights was one of the
primary responsibilities of the republican state. Concern that a
powerful central government would trample on the rights of
individual property owners had motivated Anti-Federalist opposition
to the new United States Constitution in the 1780s and 1790s, and
the protection of individual, as opposed to corporate, property
remained a vital component of "old republican" political thought in
Virginia in the 1810s and 1820s. 11 The fact that a distant central
government could not be trusted to protect the property rights of
individual citizens was a primary reason for insisting that sovereign
authority properly resided at the state and local level. While a
powerful central government might pose the greatest threat to
individual property rights, legislatively sanctioned interference with
property rights at the state level was no less objectionable. 2
A Marshall-like concern for the constitutional protection of
property rights was evident in the 1828 decision of the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia in Crenshaw and Crenshaw v. Slate

10. For the general Virginia reaction to the nationalizing tendencies of the
Marshall Court, see F. THORNTON MILLER, JURIES AND JUDGES VERSUS THE LAW:
VIRGINIA'S PROVINCIAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVE,

1783-1828 (1994); WILLIAM G.

SHADE, DEMOCRATIZING THE OLD DOMINION: VIRGINIA AND THE SECOND PARTY

SYSTEM 56, 62, 228, 229 (1996); and G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT

AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-35, at 485-524 (1987). For the specific attack on
the Marshall Court launched by Spencer Roane, see Samuel R. Olken, John
Marshall and Spencer Roane: An HistoricalAnalysis of their Conflict over U.S.
Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction, 1990 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 125 (comparing

Marshall's judicial nationalism with Roane's states' rights interpretation of
judicial review); JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND

(Gerald Gunther ed, 1969); Virginia Opposition to Chief Justice MarshallReprints from Richmond Enquirer, 1821, 2 JOHN P. BRANCH HISTORICAL PAPERS
OF RANDOLPH-MACON COLLEGE 78-102 (1906).

11. On Virginia Anti-Federalists in the founding era, see J. Gordon Hylton,
Virginia and the Ratification of the Bill of Rights, 1789.91, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 33
(1991); J. Gordon Hylton, James Madison, Virginia Politics, and the Bill of

Rights, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 275 (1989). On the continuation of AntiFederalist ideas into the antebellum period, see NORMAN RISJORD, THE OLD
REPUBLICANS: SOUTHERN CONSERVATISM IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON (1965) and
SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING
TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788-1828, at 274-88 (1999).

12. On the relationship between states' rights constitutionalism and the
protection of property rights in Virginia during the early nineteenth century, see
generally

ROBERT

E.

SHALHOPE,

JOHN TAYLOR

OF

CAROLINE:

REPUBLICAN (1980); MILLER, supranote 10; SHADE, supranote 10.
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River Company,3 in which the state's highest court was asked to
nullify an act of the Virginia General Assembly authorizing the
improvement of the Slate River, a previously non-navigable
waterway in central Virginia."
The January 29, 1819 Act
incorporated a joint stock company for purposes of improving the
navigation of the Slate River "from its junction with the James
River, to the highest practicable point of improvement." Once the
river was navigable "in ordinary seasons, by vessels drawing one foot
water," the river was to be declared a public highway and the
company was entitled to collect tolls."5
To facilitate the
transformation to navigability, the Act also required mill owners to
erect locks through their dams or else construct canals around them
sufficient for the use of loaded boats. Such alterations had to be
made within six months of the time that the river had been made
navigable to the site of the dam, and the mill owner was charged
with responsibility for maintaining the locks or canal once
constructed.
Those who failed to comply with the Act were subject to a fine of
twenty dollars each time a boat could not pass over or around their
dam. In addition, mill owners were made civilly liable for any
damages that the boat owner might incur. If the mill owner still
failed to construct locks or a canal within eighteen months after the
river had been made navigable to his location, the mill-dam was to
be declared a nuisance, and the Trustees of the Slate River Company
were authorized to clear it away and charge the expense of doing so
to the mill owner.
Ashbury and Thomas B. Crenshaw were the owners and
operators of a water-grist mill located approximately a mile and a
half from the mouth of the Slate River in Buckingham County in
central Virginia. The mill had been constructed by a previous owner,
Charles A. Scott, with the necessary permission of the local county
court in 1802. In 1807, Scott sold the mill and dam to John
Cunningham for $20,000. Then, on July 28, 1824, the Crenshaws
purchased the mill from Cunningham's daughter and her husband.
The Crenshaw purchase occurred more than five years after the
chartering of the Slate River Company. According to the testimony,
the mill-dam was seventeen feet high and valued at $3,000, and was
one of five such dams on the Slate River.
Having spent five years raising capital through the sale of
stock, the company began work on the river in early 1824. In
addition to beginning at the mouth of the river, the company also
apparently began work on a portion of the river beyond the
Crenshaw dam. Having completed improvements to navigation up
13. 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 245 (1828).
14. Act to improve the navigationof the Slate River, VA. ACTS, 68-73 (1818).
15. Crenshaw, 27 Va. at 247. Unless otherwise indicated, facts pertaining to
the dispute in Crenshaw are taken from the text of the case itself.
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to the Crenshaw dam, the Slate River Company notified the
Crenshaws in late 1824 or early 1825 that six months had now
passed, and they were obligated to begin construction of the locks.
According to subsequent testimony, the Crenshaws concluded that a
canal was impractical and estimated that the cost of constructing the
necessary locks would be $7,000, plus the cost of maintaining it.
Moreover, they were apparently concerned that their mill could not
be operated properly once the locks were constructed.
Rather than comply with the statute, the Crenshaws filed suit
against the Trustees in the Superior Court of Chancery for the
Richmond District on March 28, 1825. In their request for an
injunction, the mill owners asked that the Trustees be enjoined from
prosecuting them for fines or from destroying their dam. The
injunction was granted the following day with the stipulation that it
would be permanent unless the company could show why the court's
action was inappropriate. The Chancellor subsequently granted the
company an extension of time to file its answer, and the following
August the company filed it formal response. Hearings were
conducted over a ten-month period in which numerous witnesses
were called. Although virtually every resident of the affected area
testified that they would rather have the mill than a navigable river,
the judge ruled in favor of the company and dissolved the injunction
in June of 1826. The Crenshaws, then, brought the case to the Court
of Appeals.
In arguing for the propriety of the injunction, the Crenshaws
insisted that imposing the cost of construction of locks and canals on
the mill owners constituted "an unjust and grievous burthen [sic]"
and would improperly interfere with their rights as the owners of the
bed of the watercourse. Essentially, they argued that the public
retained no interest in the Slate River once the construction of the
mill had been authorized by the lawful authorities; consequently, the
state-sanctioned destruction of their dam constituted a taking of
their property without compensation.
This argument faced a number of potential problems. First of
all, it was widely recognized that the public retained an interest in
navigable waterways and that a private landowner's rights to use
the water were inferior to those of the public. Whether this principle
applied to formerly non-navigable streams being made navigable had
apparently not been resolved in Virginia.
Furthermore, the
Crenshaws' "takings" argument was undercut by the fact that the
Virginia Constitution of 1776, still in force, lacked a takings clause of
the sort contained in the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and in the constitutions of many states. While Section
1 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights (which was generally afforded
constitutional status although technically not part of the state's
constitution) did provide that all men had the right to "the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and
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possessing property," that clause did not speak directly to the right
to compensation when property was taken for a public purpose."
The only other provision pertaining to property rights was Section 11
of the Declaration of Rights, which
encouraged trial by jury in
"controversies respecting property." 17
Moreover, while the principle of judicial review had been
recognized in Virginia as of 1828, Virginia's highest court had shown
little evidence of a willingness to second guess the legislature on
issues of constitutionality."8 As of that year, the state's highest
courts had struck down an act of the legislature on only one occasion
in 1793, and that case had involved a technical question pertaining
to the equity powers of the newly created district court judges.
Moreover, that decision had been handed down, not by the Supreme
Court of Appeals, but by the lower ranking General Court. 9
In 1828, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia consisted of
five members. Three members, President Francis Brooke, John
Coalter, and William Cabell, had been appointed to the court in
1811. The remaining two members, John Williams Green and
Dabney Carr, joined in 1822 and 1824, respectively, with Williams
replacing the legendary Spencer Roane.Y All were natives of the
state, and all five appear to have been identified with the cause of
states' rights constitutionalism.
Brooke appears to have been the most Whiggish of the group.
He and Henry Clay were confidants for more than 50 years, and in
the 1820's, Brooke lent his name to a number of anti-Andrew
Jackson political movements, in the process indicating his support
not just for his friend Clay but for John Quincy Adams as well. On
the other hand, in 1815, Brooke denied that the United States
16. For the Virginia Constitution of 1776 and the Declaration of Rights, see 10
SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 48-56 (Swindler

ed., 1979). For the clause quoted, see id. at 49. A taking clause, resembling the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, was added to the Virginia
Constitution of 1830. Id. at 62 (inserted as a limitation on legislative power).
17. Id. at 50.
18. See generally, THOMAS R. MORRIS, THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT: AN
INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 9-13 (1975) and MARGARET NELSON, A
HISTORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW INVIRGINIA, 1789-1928, at 1-34 (1947).
19. Kemper v. Hawkins, 1 Va. Cases 31 (1793).

20. There is surprisingly little biographical information available on the
careers of these five justices. See S.S.P. Patteson, The Supreme Court of Appeals

of Virginia, 5 GREEN BAG 310, 322-29, 361-62 (1893) (describing brief sketches of
all five justices); Lyon G. Tyler, ed., 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF VIRGINIA BIOGRAPHY 47-

48, 62-63 (1915); William R. Shands, Francis Taliferro Brooke, ANNUAL REPORTS
OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 407-22 (1928); John Stewart Bryan,
John Coalter, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 46068 (1929); Henry C. Reily, William H. Cabell, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE VIRGINIA
STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 581-612 (1930). See also RICHARD BEALE DAVIS,
FRANCIS WALKER GILMER: LIFE AND LEARNING IN JEFFERSON'S VIRGINIA (1939)
(discussing numerous references to Dabney Carr and to a lesser extent, Coalter

and Cabell).
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Supreme Court had the constitutional authority to review decisions
of the state supreme courts. In an opinion in Hunter v. Martin,
2
Devisee of Fairfax,
Brooke argued, like his colleague Spencer Roane,
that Section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act that permitted Supreme
Court review of state court decisions was unconstitutional. (The
Hunter case eventually resulted in the United States Supreme
Court's landmark opinion in Martin v. Hunter'sLessee. 22)
Cabell was a strong states' rights advocate who had voted for
the Virginia Resolutions in 1798 as a member of the Virginia
legislature. He also served as a presidential elector for Jefferson in
1800 and 1804, and his opinion, not Roane's or Brooke's, was
actually the lead opinion in Hunter v. Martin and thereby the first to
announce the unanimous decision of the court. Coalter did not
participate in Hunter, but there was nothing in his long career to
suggest that he, a close friend and in-law of states' rights paragons
John Randolph of Roanoke and Beverley Tucker, disagreed with the
reasoning of his colleagues in that case. The two younger justices
also seemed to share the states' rights views of their more senior
colleagues. Green was chosen to replace Spencer Roane because he
was widely assumed to hold similar views to those of his illustrious
predecessor, and Carr was an active participant in the intellectual
world of Virginia republicanism. 2
While Brooke might have been somewhat sympathetic to the
position of the Slate River Company, given his Whiggish
inclinations, he did not participate in the resolution of the appeal.
For the other four judges, however, the answer was clear. The
provisions of the Act requiring mill owners either to assume the costs
of constructing the locks and canals or to acquiesce in the destruction
of their dams had exceeded the bounds of constitutional authority.
The judges issued their opinions in seriatim form, which was
the custom of the era. The first opinion, written by Dabney Carr,
concluded that the Slate River had not been navigable; therefore, its
bed was owned by the owner of the land on each side. Carr then
reasoned that the requirement of building the locks would effectively
render the Crenshaw mill worthless, since it was unclear whether
the mill could be operated with the locks in place. While Carr did
not deny that the state had the authority through its power of
eminent domain to take the Crenshaws' property for a public
purpose, he insisted that this could only be done with the payment of
"a fair compensation." Such a principal, he insisted, is "laid down by
the writers on Natural Law, Civil Law, Common Law, and the Law
of every civilized country."24 Although Carr noted that he was sure
that the legislature had not intended to take property without
21. 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1 (1815).
22. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
23. See generally DAVIS, supranote 20.

24. Crenshaw, 27 Va. at 265.
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paying compensation, he concluded that "whether we judge this Law
by the principles of all Civilized Governments, by the Federal
Constitution, or that of our own State, it is unconstitutional and
void." 5'
For Coalter, the key was that the owners of the mill and their
predecessors had lawfully erected the mill and the dam pursuant to
the requirements of law. Virginia clearly, and in his mind correctly,
operated on the premise that mills provided a great public benefit.
Having authorized the building of the mill through the Acts of its
agents in Buckingham County and the owner having made a
substantial investment in its creation, Coalter reasoned, the state
could not now effectively retract its permission to operate the mill
without paying compensation.
For Green, the key was that the state had clearly transferred
the public right to the stream to the landowners, and it could not
now reclaim it without paying compensation. However, unlike his
colleagues who found the source of the principle they were invoking
in the unwritten common law of the state, Green turned to the text
of the Virginia Declaration of Rights. While he insisted that the
United States Constitution had no bearing on this case -which Carr
seemed to have suggestedGreen found that the language
pertaining to "the means of acquiring and possessing property" in
the Virginia Declaration of Rights implicitly created a right to "fair
compensation" when property was taken for a public purpose.
Although Green conceded that the legislature no doubt assumed that
the rights of the landowner here were subordinate to the rights of
the public, he characterized this as a judicial question which the
doctrine of separation of powers dictated be resolved by the courts
and not the legislature. Cabell concurred in a one-paragraph opinion
in which he agreed that whatever the rights of the public in a nonnavigable watercourse might be, those rights had been transferred to
the owners of the mill when they undertook to construct it pursuant
to a court order. While such a decision could be reversed, he
concluded, it could not be done without paying just compensation.
Consequently, the normally deferential Supreme Court of
Appeals was unanimously unwilling to ignore the potential injury to
the Crenshaws and their property. In a manner quite reminiscent of
their contemporary, John Marshall, they were willing to engage in a
broad reading of the law to protect the interests of an aggrieved
property owner.
Lacking a specific provision in their state
constitution dictating the result that they felt justice required, the
judges imaginatively reread their own constitution and the common
law tradition to find a right to fair or just compensation -and more
importantly to impose a limit on the state legislature's power to
authorize internal improvements.
Whether the source be the
25. Id.at 266.
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common law, natural law, or a broad reading of "the means of
acquiring and possessing property" language in the Virginia
Declaration of Rights, the judges were unwilling to let a legislative
finding of social utility over-ride the rights of property owners.
While their ideas regarding the purpose behind the protection of
property rights have differed from those of Marshall, the judges of
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia were just as committed to
the protection of property rights as their more nationally-minded
contemporary on the federal bench.

